

## **Protecting Vulnerable People, Building ASEAN Identity, and Narrowing the Development Gap**

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IN ATTEMPTING TO make recommendations on ways in which to develop the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC) and ASEAN-Japan cooperation, this chapter adopts four main documents as the bases for further investigation. One is the ASCC Blueprint, while the other three are key documents in the evolution of ASEAN-Japan cooperation: the Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium, announced in December 2003; the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali Declaration), endorsed in 2011; and the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action 2011–2015. While the two declarations focused primarily on the economic partnership, the socio-cultural aspects were included to some extent in the Plan of Action, as will be described in this chapter.

The chapter starts with a discussion of two important global trends impacting ASEAN: (1) the shift from a growth-centered to a human-centered development paradigm and (2) the adoption of a human-centered rights-based approach in addition to the more conventional needs-based approach seen in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To identify future plans for ASEAN-Japan cooperation, the chapter first assesses past cooperative initiatives with specific reference to the Miyazawa Plan that was implemented during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the human security activities supported by the Japanese government during the early 2000s. Following a review of efforts to date, it examines the ASCC Blueprint and the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action 2011–2015. The discussion focuses on three thematic issues of particular relevance for ASEAN and Japan—protecting

vulnerable people, building ASEAN identity, and narrowing the development gap—and outlines activities in those areas that have been proposed for 2011–2015. Finally, it concludes by offering recommendations for initiatives to be implemented in 2015–2030.

## GLOBAL TRENDS

### **The Shift from a Growth-Centered to a Human-Centered Development Paradigm**

A shift is currently underway in the development paradigm as it moves from a growth-centered to a human-centered approach. During the 1980s and 1990s, development paradigms evolved that focused on the interaction between the economic globalization and social globalization processes. Economic globalization is seen in the global expansion of capitalism in the form of multinational corporations and financial institutions, information technology, and consumerism. Social globalization, on the other hand, focuses on human development, or people-centered development, and its related issues. Studies have shown that there is a negative correlation between globalization and equitable income distribution both within and among nations. The income gap between the rich and the poor has grown, while the gap between rich and poor nations has increased as well. It has been recognized that the development processes taking place in developing nations have led to larger income gaps, with greater social inequality and social disintegration. A human-centered development concept has therefore been offered as an alternative strategy to bring about a more equitable development outcome.

The 1972 International Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm concluded with an agreement to advocate the concept of “sustainable development,” where economic, social, and environmental development must take place as part of the same process rather than allowing one dimension to have priority over the other two. In addition, “sustainable development” means that development activities will not exploit the natural resources that should be left for future generations. The Earth Summit that took place in Rio de Janeiro 10 years later also further strengthened advocacy efforts related to this point.

The adoption of UN conventions and declarations targeting specific groups of people, such as women, children, people with disabilities, migrant workers, ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples, also demonstrates that the development process needs to focus on specific groups of people who

are affected. Hence, the people-centered development concept has gradually been incorporated into mainstream development efforts.

## **Adopting a Human-Centered and Rights-Based Approach to Development**

In addition to shifting from a growth-centered to a human-centered development paradigm, another shift recognized by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is the shift from a needs-based to a rights-based approach. The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development has been a key instrument in bringing about a recognition of “development” as being a human right, in addition to the needs-based approach adopted previously.

During the first decade of the 21st century, two other UN policy outcomes brought about a confirmation of the rights-based approach to development. On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to elevate the earlier Commission on Human Rights to a “Human Rights Council,” placing it roughly on par with the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). However, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is still located in Geneva, while the offices of the Security Council and ECOSOC are in New York.

In addition, in light of the growing awareness of the negative impact of growth-centered development and the effect of multinational firms’ activities on developing countries, in 2008, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Professor John G. Ruggie as UN special representative of the secretary-general to study the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Essentially, Ruggie went back to the concepts introduced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two international covenants that followed—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—and confirmed the three obligations of states: the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect, and the obligation to fulfill. Since globalization has altered the economic conditions worldwide and the impact of the private sector has become increasingly detrimental, the report recognized the role of nonstate actors as being very important. In other words, the states are not the only players that must fulfill the obligation to bring about the realization of rights; nonstate actors are also obligated to remedy the negative impact caused by their development activities. As a result, in June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the final product of Ruggie’s study,

the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the UN ‘Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Framework.”

## ASSESSMENT OF ASEAN-JAPAN COOPERATION TO DATE

Two major Japanese support programs are examined in this chapter: the Miyazawa Plan for the recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the Japanese government’s support for the Commission on Human Security during the period of 2000–2003. In addition to these two outstanding initiatives, Japan has made numerous other contributions in the social and cultural sectors, including governmental support provided by agencies such as the Japan Foundation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and others, as well as nongovernmental support from such private-sector organizations as the Toyota Foundation, the Nippon Foundation, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. The latter group of contributors, however, are not discussed here.

### **The Miyazawa Plan for the Recovery from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis**

The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a wake-up call for all ASEAN nations. The crisis started in Thailand and spread to other ASEAN countries, causing many firms to close down. The unemployment rate escalated and the number of people below the poverty line rose as well. Many stimulus packages were introduced in the years immediately following the crisis, and gradually the number of people living below the poverty line began to decline again. The stimulus packages included the World Bank Social Fund Project, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Social Sector Program Loan, and the Japanese government’s Miyazawa Plan.

After the publication of the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s *Trade and Development Report 1998*, Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa announced his government’s intention to spend some US\$30 billion in aid to support adversely affected Asian countries. The proposal, called the Miyazawa Plan, targeted the five most seriously affected Asian economies (Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), and was designed to help restructure the corporate and banking sectors, alleviate the credit crunch, and establish social safety nets in those countries.<sup>1</sup>

Depending on the school of thought or the international organization, the term “social safety nets” has been defined differently. Nevertheless, the core concept encompasses all kinds of social devices to protect people from poverty, unemployment, disease, disaster, and so on. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the first collective initiative on social safety nets was launched at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders Meeting in November 1998. As the globalization agenda has broadened and deepened, the concept of social safety nets in APEC economies has been defined more broadly as follows:

1. In the short run, compensatory policies and social assistance programs can be designed to help the losers, especially the poor, to deal with the transition costs of adjustment and to benefit from the new open trade and investment regime.
2. In the medium term, public spending on social services, such as basic education, primary health, and nutrition, should be strengthened to expand the coverage of their services and improve their efficiency. Basic social services serve as an effective social safety net, and therefore expenditures for basic social services should be protected.
3. In the long run, the social security and productive welfare system should be developed to cushion negative shocks from a global economy in a comprehensive manner.<sup>2</sup>

It must be noted here that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when the World Bank Social Fund Project, the ADB Social Sector Program Loan, and the Miyazawa Plan were implemented, the “social safety nets” concept was broadly defined as indicated above.

In the case of Thailand, the social reform loans consisted of US\$1.45 billion from the Miyazawa loan, US\$600 million from the World Bank, US\$600 million from the Japan Export-Import Bank, and US\$250 million from Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF). The objectives were to relieve the burden on the poor and provide social infrastructure for future development. Six strategies were adopted for implementation: (1) create jobs to reduce the social impact of the crisis, (2) improve the quality of life of the people, (3) support infrastructure for future development, (4) improve capacity for export competitiveness, (5) support the development of economic zones and border areas, and (6) improve efficiency in government administration. However, it is to be expected that such an ambitious plan would not be totally successful. While community-based development projects were very much appreciated, the infrastructure projects proved to be less so. Better planning and packaging should lead to more comprehensive social safety net programs for longer-term implementation.<sup>3</sup>

## Japan's Support for Human Security Activities

During the 1980s and 1990s, the UNDP promoted a rights-based development paradigm. The concept of “human security” was the theme of the 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report*, and an independent Commission on Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. The commission was officially established in June 2001 and had a two-year lifespan that resulted in a report titled *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People*, which was released in May 2003.<sup>4</sup> The commission concluded that since a conventional “state security” framework alone can no longer fully ensure people’s survival, livelihood, and dignity, the concept of “human security” is needed to complement the traditional state-centric paradigm.

The concept of “human security” proposes that security be viewed in terms of the threats to and rights of individuals. The conventional development strategy of satisfying the “basic minimum needs” of the people has gradually shifted to view human development in terms of the rights of people to have a decent standard of living. In the 1994 *UNDP Human Development Report*, threats were considered under seven main categories: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.<sup>5</sup> These issues were identified as threatening the wellbeing of people and therefore the report stated that they need to be securitized. In the process of securitization to achieve the goal of ensuring the wellbeing of the people, it is critical that people have “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” This means that in terms of a development paradigm, there has been a shift to combine needs-based and rights-based development. The Commission on Human Security was headed by Sadako Ogata, who came from the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, and Professor Amartya Sen, a Noble laureate in development economics. They classified human security issues as (1) human security of people on the move, and (2) human security of people affected by development. Thanks in no small part to the strong leadership of Ogata on this issue, the Japanese government has subsequently adopted and generously promoted the human security concept as a key component of its foreign policy. The commission was designed to be in operation for just two years, but it succeeded in integrating the “rights” concept into the development paradigm.

According to a 2009 report from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the late Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced in a policy speech in Hanoi in December 1998 that a trust fund would be established in the UN to promote human security.<sup>6</sup> The government of Japan fulfilled this commitment and founded the UN Trust Fund for Human Security in

March 1999, with an initial contribution of about ¥500 million (approximately US\$4.63 million). By FY2009, the total contributions amounted to ¥39 billion (approximately US\$346.58 million), making the trust fund one of the largest of its kind established in the UN. Approved projects by number and budget as of March 2009 are presented below:

**Table 1. UN Trust Fund for Human Security projects by region, as of March 2009**

Region	No. of projects	Budget (US\$)
Asia Pacific (incl. ASEAN)	82	90,521,647
(ASEAN only)	(33)	(32,206,600)
Africa	55	101,457,244
Europe	20	71,633,408
Latin America/Caribbean	18	24,733,873
Others	16	15,081,994
Total	191	303,206,600

Source: MOFA, Global Issues Cooperation Division, *The Trust Fund for Human Security for the "Human-centered" 21st Century* (August 2009).

Consequently, the generous contribution of the Japanese government in the form of a trust fund offers a good example of how Japan might also make contributions in a similar manner for ASEAN. The concrete details on the philosophy, objectives, and manner of implementation would have to be designed to fit with the changing post-2015 environment. The Japanese government would have to keep in mind also that the UN General Assembly endorsed the establishment of the Human Rights Council to replace the Human Rights Commission in 2006. This new development would have to be included in the consideration of a post-2015 trust fund as well. The Japanese government may want to review the objectives of the existing trust fund or set up a separate trust fund for ASEAN.

#### BLUEPRINT FOR THE ASCC AND THE ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION 2011–2015

The *Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–2015* spelled out a number of objectives that were to be the focus of the ASCC Blueprint:

- (a) human development
- (b) social welfare and protection
- (c) social justice and rights
- (d) ensuring environmental sustainability

- (e) building the ASEAN identity
- (f) narrowing the development gap

This section examines categories (c), (e), and (f) and analyzes how those issues are addressed in the ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action and in what areas ASEAN and Japan might cooperate further. When discussing issues identified in the ASCC Blueprint, if the same issue is also indicated in the Plan of Action 2011–2015, they are addressed together.

## Social Justice and Rights

1. Promotion and protection of the rights and welfare of women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities

ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Safeguard the interests and rights as well as provide equal opportunities and raise the quality of life and standard of living for women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.<sup>7</sup>

Among the action plans of the ASCC is to work toward the establishment of an ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (hereafter, ASEAN Commission on Women and Children). Since all of the ASEAN member states have signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ASEAN member states agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children as an intergovernmental commission with two representatives from each country, one representing women and one representing children and youth. The commission was established in 2010 and the output and outcomes of the commission have yet to be evaluated. On the issue of violence against women, efforts are being made by UN Women, civil society organizations, and various government agencies through workshops and seminars. It is not certain, however, that the ASCC Work Plan to Operationalize the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in ASEAN will be concretized.

At present, one of the critical issues affecting vulnerable groups is the trafficking of women and children. Human trafficking is a notorious phenomenon in Asia, and in recent decades, as globalization has progressed, human trafficking has become an increasingly transnational and organized crime, involving vast international and local crime networks. Individuals being trafficked include women and children as well as migrant workers.



There has been no concrete ASEAN-Japan support on this issue as such, but according to a 2009 report from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there have been many projects supported by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. The appendix of that report provided a list of projects supported as of August 2009, indicating that 11 projects totaling US\$9.8 million had been granted to ASEAN countries through different UN agencies.<sup>8</sup> In addition, JICA and other Japanese private foundations have been providing assistance to vulnerable groups. It is recommended that this type of support be continued and strengthened.

#### Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) The Japanese government should provide bilateral support for social safety net programs to provide humanitarian assistance and human rights protection schemes for vulnerable groups.
- (2) ASEAN member states should agree to support the establishment of a concrete institution or organization to deal with the human trafficking of women and children. Based on data on projects supported by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, at least four ASEAN projects totaling US\$3.9 million have been granted through UN agencies working in the region. It is therefore recommended that the Japanese government consider supporting an ASEAN anti-trafficking institution.
- (3) ASEAN member states should agree to strengthen the functioning of the recently established ASEAN Commission on Women and Children. Although Japan has been supporting projects on women and children through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, which are implemented by UN agencies, the Japanese government should consider providing direct support to the commission.

## 2. Protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers

**ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** Ensure fair and comprehensive migration policies and adequate protection for all migrant workers in accordance with the laws, regulations, and policies of respective ASEAN member states, as well as implement the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers.

ASEAN-Japan Plan of Action 2011–2015: 3.10 Cooperation on Social Justice—Cooperate on programs that will assist migrant workers and their families in achieving financial stability through training, investment promotion, savings assistance, and entrepreneurship development programs; and promote dialogue on the adoption of arrangements for the portability

of social security benefits for migrant workers and for the harmonization of remittance charges.

It is well recognized that migrant workers are a sensitive issue for most countries. Among ASEAN member states, some are exporting labor, some need to import labor, while others are exporting, importing, as well as serving as transit states through which migrants move back and forth in search of employment opportunities. On the issue of migrant workers, to date three ASEAN member states—the Philippines, Indonesia, and Cambodia—have signed the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

On January 13, 2007, at the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers. Article 22 of the declaration tasks the governments with developing “an ASEAN instrument on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers, consistent with ASEAN’s vision of a caring and sharing Community.” The ASEAN foreign ministers subsequently agreed to set up an ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of Rights of Migrant Workers (hereafter, ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers) to carry forward the regional work on migration. The working group formed a Drafting Committee on the ASEAN Instrument for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, composed of representatives of four governments—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The drafting committee is still working on a draft, but seems to have reached a deadlock.

Without an agreement on labor protection standards, minimum wages, and additional labor regulations and laws to apply to migrant workers, many governments have been using immigration law to control migrant labor from neighboring countries, classifying them as illegal migrant workers. With the planned integration of the ASEAN Community coming up at the end of 2015, the issue of migrant workers and cross-border movements of people will have to be dealt with seriously. It is urgent that ASEAN member states reach an agreement on this issue since further procrastination will lead to conflicts among ASEAN member states.

To date, numerous Japanese investors have been operating in ASEAN regions dominated by migrant workers, and these investors have been responsible for the welfare of the workers. They have been known to be generous in terms of wages and welfare. They have thus been setting a positive example through their actions, and this could usefully be expanded through corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and support for migrant-oriented civil society organizations. Only one project on the

health conditions of migrant workers in Thailand has been supported by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, through the WHO at the amount of US\$1.5 million.

Recommendations for future ASEAN-Japan cooperation:

- (1) The ASEAN Secretariat should establish regional programs and the Japanese government should implement bilateral programs to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers.
- (2) ASEAN member states should support the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers before 2015 and should support the operations of the committee after 2015. Since Japanese investors are operating in the ASEAN region in areas composed mostly of migrant workers, it would therefore be natural for the Japanese government to support the establishment of such a committee.

### 3. Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility

ASCC BLUEPRINT OBJECTIVE: Ensure that CSR is incorporated in the corporate agenda and contribute toward sustainable socioeconomic development in ASEAN member states.

In addition to the labor standards required in the employment realm in the formal economic sector, the impact of the corporate sector on different groups within society as well as on the exploitation of natural resources and the environment must be explored. In November 2010, the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism organized a “Workshop on Corporate Social Responsibility within an ASEAN Human Rights Framework” in Singapore. In June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed Ruggie’s “Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the UN ‘Protect-Respect-Remedy’ Framework.” The guidelines effectively established an authoritative global reference point for preventing and addressing the risk of adverse impacts on human rights linked to business activities. As a consequence, in the same year, the International Coordination Committee (ICC) of the National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) adopted Business and Human Rights as a theme for ICC activities for the year 2012–2013. Workshops on business and human rights have been planned for all four regions of the ICC. The Asia Pacific workshop took place in March 2012 in Seoul, Korea, and that was followed by several more workshops organized during 2012–2013.

With many activities taking place during 2011–2013, it appears that the so-called “CSR movement” is bringing about mutual understanding on the guiding principles among corporations and is reducing gaps in CSR

implementation programs within and between ASEAN member states. Corporations are encouraged to develop and adopt a CSR code of conduct. Efforts are being made to transform the ASEAN CSR agenda into action plans to be implemented in the ASEAN Community. In the process, corporations are being convinced to adopt a rights-based approach in their total production process rather than presenting CSR as a separate image-making activity.

Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) The ASEAN Secretariat should set up a program to support the CSR and human rights activities of both Japanese and ASEAN multinational firms.
- (2) The ASEAN Secretariat together with Japanese corporations should establish an award scheme to honor multinational firms with best practices in CSR and business and human rights programs.

## **Building the ASEAN Identity**

The ASEAN identity is the basis of Southeast Asia's regional interests. This identity includes collective personality, norms, values, and beliefs, as well as aspirations as one ASEAN community.

### **1. Promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community**

**ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** Create a sense of belonging, consolidate unity in diversity and enhance deeper mutual understanding among ASEAN member states about their culture, history, religion, and civilization.

**ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION 2011–2015:** 3.9 Cooperation on information and media—3.9.1 Enhance regional cooperation on information and media through the promotion of mutually beneficial information and media partnerships, exchanges, and other person-to-person activities; and 3.9.2 enhance cooperation in the development of human resources, particularly in capacity building in new media or information technology and their convergent applicants for mobile, Internet, digital broadcasting, and development of new content.

In the present-day ASEAN region, a crisis is taking place in the social order, and development and sociocultural paradigms are breaking down. All ASEAN states are facing the dilemma of how to preserve conventional and traditional values while adopting new values and norms. Modern society

needs a new paradigm to describe the social relationship wherein different organic groups unite with shared ethical and moral bonds, working toward the same, unified social order. ASEAN society must be characterized by three critical components: democracy, good governance, and people's participation. These values need to be promoted as appropriate and acceptable so that they can be observed at all levels, including the institutional level in the form of civic groups, organizations, or new constitutions.

In creating a sustainable ASEAN identity, ASEAN member states must conserve some of their traditions and at the same time recognize democracy and the equality of different organic cultural groups within their society. Discrimination based on gender, class, culture, or ethnicity must not be permitted.

Forms of cultural relations include cultural pluralism, which indicates compatible relationships between cultural and ethnic groups. In contrast, incompatible relationships may be seen in civic movements such as militant and separatist movements, where conflicts may have started as disputes between cultural groups but have developed into conflicts between one ethnic minority group and the majority-controlled state. The challenge facing ASEAN member states is how to prevent cultural conflicts from escalating to the unmanageable stage.

In the process of building a sustainable ASEAN identity through people's participation, all forms of media and information technology need to be employed. At present, that process has not been sufficiently introduced. Most ASEAN member states have not yet reached the realization that in order for the ASEAN community and identity to be formed and sustained, collaborative efforts by all states are essential.

Although Japan is not a member state of ASEAN, it can still play a role in building ASEAN identity by recognizing and appreciating ASEAN's cultural diversity. Since World War II, there has been no cultural hegemony in the region, despite the popularity of Japanese movies, cartoons, and other consumer products dominating ASEAN markets and media space. Japanese support for the promotion of an ASEAN identity would be very much appreciated by ASEAN communities.

#### Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) The ASEAN Secretariat should support programs identified in the Plan of Action 2011–2015, such as media partnerships, exchanges, and other person-to-person activities, as well as capacity building in new media technology, and the development of new content.
- (2) The Japanese government should support collaboration between NHK—Japan's national broadcasting network—and ASEAN broadcast networks, both at the regional and bilateral levels.

## 2. Preservation and Promotion of ASEAN Cultural Heritage

ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Promote the conservation and preservation of ASEAN cultural heritage to ensure its continuity to enhance awareness and understanding of the people about the unique history of the region and the cultural similarities and differences between and among ASEAN member states, as well as to protect the distinctiveness of ASEAN cultural heritage as a whole.

THE ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION 2011–2015: 3.8.1 Enhance regional cooperation in cultural heritage—Enhance regional cooperation in cultural heritage through the establishment of a network of experts in the field of conservation of arts, artifacts, and cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible.

To overcome the threat of globalization and loss of cultural identity, the reconstruction of ASEAN's identity and culture has been recommended. The nationalistic, ethnic, and fundamentalist reactions being generated by globalization could lead to a strong assertion of local cultures. This might take the form of reviving or simulating local traditions and ceremonies, or inventing new ones. The revival of some cultural practices would help strengthen the existing cultural and social capital. Without strong efforts to revive selected cultural practices, cultural deterioration is inevitable. On the other hand, social capital is seen in localism. Local cultures are believed to have distinctive features of homogeneity and an integrated cultural identity that is both enduring and unique. Members of a locality form a distinctive community with its own unique culture.

To counter cultural globalization, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has been instrumental in bringing about the identification of cultural heritage, the revival of indigenous knowledge, and the recognition of intangible culture. While the direct impact of these attempts is ambiguous, at least indirectly they are recognized to be beneficial in promoting tourism. Cultural items are now being patented and cultural capitalism is also on the rise. This process has also supported the empowerment of marginalized people.

Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) Each ASEAN member state should work to revive its local culture, indigenous culture and knowledge, and cultural heritage as an alternative cultural process to counter globalism. This process, in effect, will help resist the spread of mass culture in manipulating the marginalized and

the powerless. The continuous support of the Japan Foundation and other organizations for cultural heritage projects in ASEAN has been very much appreciated and should be continued.

- (2) The ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN member states should support the concepts of cultural diversity, local cultures, and community identity by establishing a “Cultural Heritage and Local Wisdom Fund.” The Japanese government should consider supporting the establishment of this fund.

### 3. Promotion of Cultural Creativity and Industry

ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Enhance ASEAN identity and togetherness through cultural creativity and the promotion of and cooperation on cultural industry.

ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION (2011–2013): 3.8 Cooperation in culture and the arts—3.8.3 Identify and address common concerns in cultural heritage management and further develop professional human resources in cultural heritage management and in the development of small and medium-sized culture enterprises (SMCE) and industries; and 3.8.4 enhance joint endeavors to create film, music, mode, and other subcultural contents by various talents of different countries in the region.

In the highly heterogeneous ASEAN region, cultural and ethnic organizations can function as civil society organizations to fulfill the needs of different ethnic groups where governments fail to do so. In socialist and welfare state societies, the government is required to satisfy the need for public goods and social welfare services. In free market societies, the demand for public goods should be supplied by the market system. But if the market fails to satisfy such demands, then the government must step in to perform this role. However, in heterogeneous societies where the demands are diverse, it may be difficult for either the market or the government to adequately supply public goods. If both the market and the government fail to provide public goods, civil society organizations and media must then move in to perform that role.

The promotion of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for the production of cultural products is being supported by many ASEAN governments. Differentiated demand has been identified as a factor in the nonprofit production of quasi-public goods, as organizations respond to differentiated tastes for the kinds of service to be consumed.<sup>9</sup> People’s preferences with respect to product variety are more heterogeneous and more intense due to cultural differences. This diversity is geographically dispersed and most governments in the region cannot accommodate these demands. Ethnicity

and religion are the two most visible factors affecting civil society sector development in developed as well as developing countries. Both civil society groups and private sector entrepreneurs should be encouraged to establish SMEs to produce cultural objects and performances.

#### Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) The Japanese government should assist the ASEAN Secretariat in establishing an SME loan program with low interest rates to provide support for ASEAN entrepreneurs who are willing to venture into the new cultural market.
- (2) The Japanese government should introduce Japan's "One Community One Product" model to ASEAN local communities by organizing study tours for knowledge transfer.

#### 4. Engagement with the Community

**ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE:** Inculcate an ASEAN identity and build a people-oriented ASEAN where people are at the center of community building, through the participation of all sectors of society.

**ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION (2011–2013):** 3.7 People to people connectivity—3.7.7 Promote exchanges among villages, municipalities, and cities; and strengthen people-to-people contacts, utilizing the schemes of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and the Japan Foundation.

Since the 1990s, civil society organizations have been recognized globally as a critical force. Traditional civil society organizations that originally formed as philanthropic, religious, labor, and community development organizations have become increasingly active. Civil society organizations have been very much empowered during the 1980s and 1990s. Many philanthropic community-development organizations shifted their orientation from a needs-based to rights-based focus and began working as advocacy groups, demanding the rights of people on various issues. Locally, organizations working on the same issue have formed networks and are working collaboratively in order to empower themselves.

Just as multinational corporations, international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization), and multilateral organizations are linked transnationally, civil society organizations are also becoming linked transnationally and are forming social movements. New social movements have become a



reality during the past two decades with some new features. Two important observations can be made about these social movements. First, it is clear that politics has moved beyond the traditional definitions that evolved around the realm of the nation-state, government, political parties, and so on. And second, these new social movements can be viewed as “resistance movements” or “civil disobedience,” not necessarily against any particular nation-state or government, but possibly against transnational entities or even supranational institutions. They are demanding more space for ordinary people, a reduction in the gap between the government and the people, and a more humane government.

Therefore, the new social movements are an alternative, providing the political space for the ASEAN Community. They are not merely replacing “government” with “governance”; the new social movements advocate for more proactive strategies to bring social justice to society. The new social movements, and especially the antiglobalization movements, are themselves developing as supranational entities, which have a high degree of changeability, adaptability, and flexibility. In this way, new social movements open political space for negotiations with other supranational organizations, such as the ASEAN Community, as well as with nation-states. However, there is an argument that the promotion of culture-based civic groups may lead to the fragmentation of society instead of integration. Thus, multiethnic civil society activities and movements based on issues are less detrimental to national security.

#### Recommendations for Future ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:

- (1) The ASEAN Secretariat, with support from the Japanese government, should support an “ASEAN Identity Project” by encouraging civil society organizations to perform political and cultural functions for cultural groups in cases where marginalized groups need support for social services as well as socio-cultural activities.
- (2) The ASEAN Secretariat, with support from Japanese counterparts, should support civil society activities by promoting the concept of “ASEAN identity” as an issue for the movement to advocate. ASEAN culture must be seen in the coexistence of diverse forms of cultural relations. ASEAN local heritage, cosmopolitanism, fusion culture, and cultural pluralism are some of the forms identified and should be allowed to coexist.

#### 5. Narrowing the Development Gap for 2015–2030

ASCC BLUEPRINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE: Strengthen cooperation to reduce the development gap, in particular the social dimensions of

development between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV countries and within ASEAN where some isolated pockets of under development persist.

ASEAN-JAPAN PLAN OF ACTION (2011–2013): 2.14.1 Provide macro-economic policy support for socio-economic development in ASEAN member states to narrow the development gap; 2.14.2 Strengthen support for the realization of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and other regional and subregional endeavors to narrow the development gaps in ASEAN to expedite regional integration; and enhance cooperation and activities within the framework of the ASEAN-Japan Centre, particularly through the promotion of trade, investment, and tourism, to narrow the development gaps.

The negative impact of globalization has been recognized as one reason for poverty in developing countries. The income gap between the rich and the poor has become wider and wider. Overinvestment by the rich brought about the collapse of the economy, as was evident in the financial and economic crises of 1997 and 2007. The mainstream capitalistic economy brought about inequality and social injustice. The concept of a sufficiency economy is now being proposed to replace the overexploitation of natural resources, overinvestment, and overconsumption. Local wisdom and knowledge are being revived and reexamined with a newfound respect instead of being discarded as old-fashioned. Cultural diversity is allowed and promoted in many societies and cultural domination is no longer acceptable.

The development gaps between the rich and the poor and between nation-states are becoming increasingly severe. The ASCC recognizes the differences between the ASEAN-6 and the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). Table 2 shows the figures from the Human Development Index (HDI) for the two groups. When comparing gross national income and the percentage of population living below the poverty line, the distinctions between the two groups are very much evident. However, it should be noted that Vietnam is gradually moving up the scale, and some of the indicators clearly indicate that Vietnam is at the top of the CLMV group, almost ready to move up to the level of the ASEAN-6 group.

With regard to the social sector indicators presented in table 3, similar observations can be made for the case of Vietnam. The figures indicate that for literacy and life expectancy, Vietnam more closely resembles the ASEAN-6 group. Figures for the employment-to-population ratio are very much the same for both groups. Among ASEAN countries, employment indicators do not indicate significant differences. On the other hand, figures

Table 2. HDI rank and value and poverty indicators of ASEAN countries

Country	2011 HDI		Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (2011) (c)	Income Gini Coefficient (d)	Pop. under national poverty (e)	Human poverty index (f)
	Rank (a)	Value (b)				
ASEAN – 6						
Brunei	33	0.838	45,753 (2005)	-	-	-
Indonesia	124	0.617	3,716	36.8	12.5 (2011)	17.0
Malaysia	61	0.761	13,685	46.2	3.8 (2009)	6.1
Philippines	112	0.644	3,478	44.0	26.5 (2009)	12.4
Singapore	26	0.866	52,569	--	--	3.9
Thailand	103	0.682	7,694	53.6	7.8 (2010)	8.5
CLMV						
Cambodia	139	0.523	1,848	44.4	30.1 (2007)	27.7
Laos	138	0.524	2,242	36.7	27.6 (2008)	30.7
Myanmar	149	0.483	1,535	--	25.6 (2010)	20.4
Vietnam	128	0.593	2,805	37.6	14.5 (2008)	12.4

Sources: (a), (b), (c), (d): United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2011* (New York: UNDP, 2011); (e) ADB, *Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators 2012* (Manila: ADB, 2012); (f) UNDP, *Human Development Report 2009* (New York: UNDP, 2009).

for safety net measures based on expenditure on health, security, and welfare are not available for all countries. At this stage, the reliability of the figures is still questionable since the concept of safety nets may not be interpreted the same way in all countries.

The issue of social safety nets needs to be further examined as an instrument to narrow the development gap between member states. Bilateral support may be provided to states at the bottom of the ranks in an attempt to improve social services and social infrastructure in countries that are in need.

Table 4 provides data from the *Global Gender Gap Report 2012*. Data are not available for Laos and Myanmar. Figures presented do not give a clear indication of differences between the ASEAN-6 and Cambodia and Vietnam. The lack of a clear distinction between the two groups may be because ASEAN societies have a similar culture and traditions as they relate to gender roles and discrimination between males and females is not related

Table 3. HDI social sector indicators for ASEAN countries

Country	Adult literacy rate (a)	Health adjusted life expectancy (b)	15 yrs+ employment to pop. ratio (2011) (c)	Safety Nets (2010) (d)	
				% expend. on health	% expend. on security & welfare
ASEAN – 6					
Brunei	95.3	66	63.1 (2001)	-	4.8
Indonesia	92.5	60	61.9 (2009)	13.9	-
Malaysia	92.5	64	60.6 (2009)	0.7	3.6
Philippines	95.4	62	59.2 (2009)	29.7	5.7
Singapore	94.7	73	61.6 (2009)	15.6	7.7
Thailand	93.5	62	72.7 (2009)	10.1	6.8
CLMV					
Cambodia	77.6	53	60.6 (2008)	-	5.2
Laos	72.7	54	65.7 (2005)	5.0	-
Myanmar	92.0	50	-	1.3	-
Vietnam	92.8	64	69.9 (2004)	36.0	-

Sources: (a), (b): *Human Development Report 2011*; (c), (d): *Framework of Inclusive Growth Indicators 2012*.

Table 4. Gender gap report in ASEAN countries, 2012

Country	Rank (a)	Score (b)	F/M Ratio of earned income (c)	F/M Ratio of literacy rate (d)	F/M ratio of labor force part. (e)	F/M ratio of seats in parliament (f)	Old-age dependency (g)	
							1981-1990	2011-2020
ASEAN – 6								
Brunei	75	0.6750	0.90	0.97	0.80	-	-	-
Indonesia	97	0.6591	0.94	0.89	0.61	0.22	0.062	0.1
Malaysia	100	0.6539	0.43	0.95	0.57	0.12	0.064	0.09
Philippines	8	0.7757	0.60	1.01	0.63	0.30	0.058	0.08
Singapore	55	0.6989	1.00	0.96	0.74	0.31	0.074	0.193
Thailand	65	0.6893	0.62	0.96	0.83	0.19	0.068	0.127
CLMV								
Cambodia	103	0.6457	0.71	0.80	0.87	0.25	-	-
Laos	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Myanmar	-	--	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	66	0.6867	0.69	0.96	0.92	0.32	0.085	0.0975

Sources: (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f): Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi, *The Global Gender Gap Report 2012* (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2012); (g): National Intelligence Council, *Global Trend 2030 Alternative Worlds* (Washington DC: NIC, 2012).

to the level of development. In all eight countries, however, it can be seen that the female-to-male (F/M) ratio of earned income and the labor force F/M ratio are equally low while the F/M ratio of seats in parliament is extremely low. On the other hand, the F/M ratio in literacy rates is mostly high, as female opportunities for education have been on par or even better than for men, except in Cambodia.

In terms of old-age dependency, it is undeniable that between 1981 and 2020, the old-age dependency ratio is increasing for all countries with available data. However, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia have a more serious problem than the rest of the ASEAN member states.

This means that support for gender equality schemes should be made across the board. All 10 member states need to establish an ASEAN empowerment scheme to bring about gender equality. At the same time, programs and projects for the elderly, together with programs and projects to address the trafficking of women and children mentioned earlier in this chapter, are still essential if the ASEAN Community is to be recognized as a socially just community.

The *Human Development Report 2009* provides information on selected conventions ratified by different countries. A breakdown of these conventions along with the ASEAN member states that have ratified them is presented in table 5. As mentioned above, most ASEAN countries have ratified the three UN conventions focusing on vulnerable groups—the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers have been ratified by only three countries. This table provides an example of international tools that may be utilized to bring about more comprehensive development for all ASEAN countries. The ASEAN Community could develop instruments to help establish common goals to strengthen the community as a whole.

To date, in addition to the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has been established and the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights (ADHR) was recently endorsed at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia in November 2012, despite strong criticism from civil society that the newly adopted ADHR does not meet international human rights standards. Furthermore, greater support is needed for the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers. The upcoming establishment of the ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 will require an agreement on labor and migration standards to be observed by all member states equally. This is an urgent issue that needs

immediate attention. As mentioned above, it is in Japan's interest to help facilitate discussions on migrant labor issues among ASEAN member states. At the moment, there seems to be a conflict of interests among and between ASEAN countries. Japan is strategically positioned to help bring about a solution that would be acceptable to all ASEAN member states and would lead to the successful establishment of an ASEAN Commission on Migrant Workers that, if and when it was established, would provide opportunities to bridge the development gap between ASEAN nations as well.

### STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE ASEAN-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP

This chapter has focused on three of the six aspects of the ASCC identified in the ASCC Blueprint: social justice and rights, building the ASEAN identity, and narrowing the development gap. To strengthen the ASCC, the chapter recommends that the ASEAN-Japan partnership support and promote a people-centered and human-oriented development paradigm through the promotion of people's participation and sense of ownership.

To promote social justice and human rights, the ASEAN-Japan partnership should engage with the community and civil society by working with community groups on projects to prevent the negative impacts of development on vulnerable peoples, including women, children and youth, the elderly, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples, and migrant workers. An ASEAN code of conduct for CSR should be encouraged to prevent negative social impacts on vulnerable groups and undesirable exploitation of natural resources.

To build an ASEAN community and identity, the ASEAN-Japan partnership should promote ASEAN consciousness and a sense of community through the preservation and promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage in a way that recognizes the unique cultural diversity of the region. Furthermore, it should promote cultural creativity and industry by supporting local craftsmanship, SMEs, and other innovative projects, both as income-generating activities and activities to strengthen a sense of ownership and identity. The support can be in the form of grants, loans to governments, as well as loans to the private sector.

To narrow the development gap, the ASEAN-Japan partnership should work with diverse groups of people to identify gaps in development, both within each country and between ASEAN countries. Concrete activities should include the following:



- Support for social safety net programs needed by the CLMV countries
- Support for gender empowerment programs for all ASEAN countries
- Close cooperation with the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children
- Support for the establishment of the ASEAN Committee on Migrant Workers

In order to pursue these activities in the 2015–2030 period, it is essential that additional studies be carried out to further explore and identify appropriate programs and projects. The approach should be forward-looking and concrete action plans should be proposed for the first five years (2016–2020), to be reviewed and improved upon after implementation. The subsequent five-year plan should then be developed based on the output or outcome of the activities in the initial phase.

## NOTES

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