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The Nexus between Peacebuilding and Regionalism in Asia Pacific: Japan's Attempt to Mainstream Peacebuilding through Human Resource Development

YUJI UESUGI

THIS CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS the significance of developing a wide range of peacebuilding capacities in Asia Pacific in order to address nontraditional security threats that emerge out of state failure, such as forced migration, transnational crime, illegal trafficking, proliferation of small arms, and terrorism. Enhancement of such regional capacities will require at least two key assets: (1) human resources and (2) platforms for joint training and action. From this perspective, this chapter examines the utility and potential of existing regional mechanisms for nurturing these essential assets.

Against this backdrop, this chapter introduces Japan's initiative for "Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding," which aims to contribute to peacebuilding through the training of civilian experts. At the same time, it points to gaps in the existing regional institutions and frameworks, including ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and calls for the creation of regional platforms that facilitate joint training and action for peacebuilding. By exploring issues of peacebuilding in the context of regionalism, the chapter also argues that capacity development for peacebuilding could be regarded as an opportunity to advance non-traditional security cooperation among the countries in Asia Pacific. The goal is to shed light on the importance of advancing civilian cooperation

in the field of peacebuilding as a vehicle for fostering regionalism and multilateral arrangements among stakeholders in the region.

NEXUS BETWEEN PEACEBUILDING, REGIONALISM, AND NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY

Before examining the role of regional cooperation in the future of peacebuilding and the effects of capacity development for peacebuilding upon the prospects for regionalism, two core terms—peacebuilding and regionalism—need to be defined. “Peacebuilding” is defined in a famous report by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”¹ This definition suggests that one of the main objectives of peacebuilding revolves around the effort to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict in its aftermath by establishing or strengthening the social foundations necessary for lasting peace. In other words, peacebuilding seeks to transform a war-torn society into a sustainable one in various arenas—politics, security, and socioeconomics—by creating or reforming the state apparatus, government institutions, and other relevant institutions, including those belonging to civil society. Such an endeavor normally requires a whole set of complex activities: political reconciliation among former belligerents; the restoration of order, rule of law, and effective governance; disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants into society; repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons; monitoring of democratic elections and promotion of political participation; demining; and implementation of a process of transitional justice; among others. In other words, peacebuilding assistance has been used as a policy tool to address certain causes of nontraditional security threats such as bad governance, “rule of the gun,” poverty, and human rights violations. This chapter, therefore, examines this aspect of peacebuilding in relation to regionalism.

On the other hand, “regionalism” can be defined, according to Donald K. Emmerson, as international gatherings of “physically more or less proximate states, societies, or economies, in various ways and to varying degrees, for ostensibly common purposes and activities—forming or nourishing a shared identity, improving conditions and solving problems, or projecting influence beyond the region whose nature is thereby purposely created or shaped.”² In this sense, the topic of regionalism does not seem to overlap with the topic of peacebuilding. However, nation building, which is an

integral part of peacebuilding, can also be defined as forming or nourishing a shared identity, improving conditions and solving problems, or projecting influence beyond the nation, whose nature is thereby purposely created or shaped. In fact, regionalism and peacebuilding—two seemingly different endeavors—share certain key features, and regionalism can inform the work of peacebuilding and vice versa.

A more concrete nexus between regionalism and peacebuilding can be found in the area of nontraditional security cooperation. Strengthening regional capacity to address nontraditional security challenges deserves more than passing notice. This is because most of the threats and risks to security in Asia Pacific are nontraditional in nature—arising primarily out of nonmilitary sources—and transnational in nature, making joint action necessary and thus giving rise to closer regional cooperation.³ Indeed, it is imperative that regional cooperation be pursued in Asia Pacific to effectively meet the region's growing number of nontraditional security challenges, as they are proving to be more severe and are increasingly likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats such as interstate wars and conflicts.⁴ Hence, peacebuilding must be recognized as a common concern for the region—one that is linked directly to the field of security and that can facilitate functional security cooperation among the major players in the region.

Nevertheless, the significance of taking part in functional security cooperation, as well as appropriate formats and methods of participation, can diverge greatly among contributing countries. This is because facets of security vary depending on the entity whose security is threatened, the nature and gravity of the threat, the source of the threat, and the authority responsible for identifying and describing the entity, the threat, and the source.⁵ In other words, security depends on individual threat perceptions, differs greatly according to an actor's status and position within the international system, and most importantly, is subject to interpretation.⁶

Moreover, the level of resources, both human and financial, that each country can pour into its peacebuilding assistance is quite different, especially between developed and developing countries in the region. The same is also true for other forms of nontraditional security cooperation to address such issues as piracy, natural disasters, infectious disease, and transnational crime, which are emerging as common security concerns in the region. However, in comparison with other dimensions of regional security cooperation, the field of peacebuilding is particularly underdeveloped, as it has not received adequate attention from policymakers in Asia Pacific.

This is understandable when one considers that until recently developing countries in the region, such as China and the member states of ASEAN, have been recipients of international development assistance, and they seem to have regarded peacebuilding assistance as a burden for donor countries—in particular Japan—to bear. Nevertheless, as Jörn Dosch points out, a rapidly growing number of nontraditional security complexes have appeared on the radar screen of policymakers in both ASEAN and China and have started to have an impact on regional security.⁷ For example, China has been active in strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN+3 (which includes China, South Korea, and Japan). China has also pursued very active and responsible policies at the regional level.⁸ In stark contrast to Japan, which has been very reluctant to contribute its military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, China now deploys a large number of troops and police officers to various UN peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world. Furthermore, some ASEAN member states are beginning to assume meaningful roles in so-called “South-South” cooperation. Taking into consideration the fact that the international community began assisting Cambodia in demining less than 20 years ago, it is remarkable that Cambodia now sends its own demining units to the UN Mission in the Sudan.

Hence, it is high time that policymakers in the region seriously consider ways to promote regional cooperation in Asia Pacific in the field of peacebuilding. Before proceeding further to the heart of the discussion, it is important to note that peacebuilding is not itself a nontraditional security challenge. It is a response to a certain set of nontraditional security challenges. State failure or state collapse is a prominent source of nontraditional security challenges in that it can lead, for instance, to an increase in transnational crime and terrorism, a massive flow of arms, or an unnatural forced migration. Thus, peacebuilding assistance is normally aimed at rebuilding a functional state so that the state apparatus or a coalition of likeminded states can tackle nontraditional security challenges effectively, sometimes individually but often in consortium with other states and international organizations.

RATIONALE FOR PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACEBUILDING

It is true that there are conflicts in Asia Pacific that remain unresolved and that conventional security threats also require close observation. In

Northeast Asia, there are serious security problems on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits. Likewise, in South Asia, a protracted conflict continues between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir. In Southeast Asia, hostilities in Mindanao (the Philippines) and southern Thailand, for example, could cause considerable threats to regional stability. Furthermore, the military regime in Myanmar is often a source of regional tension.

Nevertheless, several violent armed conflicts in the region have been transformed in the recent past, including in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Aceh (Indonesia), and Nepal, among others. These post-conflict societies have undergone difficult peacebuilding processes. Likewise, a recent forceful ending to the protracted violent conflict in Sri Lanka has brought a new set of peacebuilding challenges. Despite the fact that the situations in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Aceh seem to have been contained to the extent that they no longer pose immanent threats to regional security, these conflicts may relapse and destabilize the region if their peacebuilding processes are mishandled. Nepal and Sri Lanka still need much attention as they have just entered into fragile and delicate peacebuilding processes.

Because peacebuilding has not only regional but also global implications, issues related to peacebuilding have so far been dealt with chiefly in the arena of the UN. The establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005 was indicative of the collective will of the international community to continuously address the challenges of failed states and state collapse through the UN. Nonetheless, much of the work of the PBC has been devoted to peacebuilding assistance in Africa. In fact, the PBC has so far dealt only with five countries, all of which are in Africa: Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Central African Republic.

Many others have been covered within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations, which has seen its tasks expand since the end of the Cold War to include key peacebuilding activities such as institutional capacity development and security sector reform in host countries. Nowadays, most contemporary UN peacekeeping operations are given “multidimensional” mandates, becoming one of the most prominent vehicles in the UN for carrying out peacebuilding assistance in post-conflict societies.

However, the UN’s capacity to carry out multidimensional peacekeeping operations is overstretched, and there has been renewed attention to regionalism and a reconsideration of the role of regional security organizations in promoting international peace and security.⁹ The international community has rediscovered the role of regional organizations in the pursuit of international peace and security, which is stipulated in Chapter VIII of

the UN Charter, and has come to a new understanding of the nature and utility of regional organizations for that purpose.

Under such circumstances, a task-sharing arrangement between the UN and regional organizations is needed in order to advance regional as well as global order. The EU and the African Union (AU) are increasingly recognized as parallel and complementary structures to the UN in addressing security issues of international concern. The EU has been active in managing crises beyond Europe, and the AU has received international support to develop its institutional capacity to respond to conflicts in Africa. Indeed, strengthening the capacity of regional organizations to cope with conflicts has become a global trend.

This new impetus for regional organizations to manage regional conflicts and assume greater responsibility for post-conflict peacebuilding assistance would advocate, in essence, European solutions to European problems, African solutions to African problems, and Asian solutions to Asian problems. Regional actors feel they are best suited to mediate in local conflicts, as they understand the dynamics of strife and cultures more intimately than outsiders. Since most conflicts are local, the assumption is that these would most likely be given more attention in the regional fora than in the global one, as the latter has a much broader agenda.¹⁰ Besides, it is the neighbors in the region that would face the most serious and immediate repercussions of peacebuilding failure.

However, in comparison with Europe and Africa, existing regional frameworks in Asia Pacific are still too weak and underdeveloped for the purpose of security cooperation.¹¹ While the growing demand for peacebuilding has nurtured action-oriented regionalism in other parts of the world, conflicts in Asia Pacific have been addressed through ad hoc initiatives of like-minded countries (e.g., responses to situations in Aceh, Sri Lanka, and Mindanao) or through the UN (e.g., responses to situations in Cambodia, Timor-Leste, and Nepal).

As stated above, the UN has been preoccupied with the various fragile states in Africa. For example, the vast majority of UN peacekeeping operations established in the post-Cold War era have been deployed with a peacebuilding mandate in Africa, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Côte d'Ivoire, to name a few. In Asia Pacific, on the other hand, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have only been deployed to Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Thus, it is unlikely that the UN will play or continue to play a pivotal role in peacebuilding assistance in Sri Lanka, Mindanao, Aceh, Nepal, southern Thailand, Tibet, or other potential flash points in Asia Pacific.

In 2005, the UN was planning to withdraw its peacekeeping operation from Timor-Leste, but it found itself in a situation in which it had no regional partners to take over peacebuilding tasks. Although a decade has already passed since the crisis erupted in Timor-Leste in 1999, neither ASEAN nor the ARF has been able to develop its institutional capacity to collectively undertake peacekeeping operations. In short, the record of achievements by the regional organizations in Asia Pacific is not impressive in the field of peacekeeping. The same can also be said with regard to peacebuilding. Neither ASEAN nor the ARF has succeeded in transforming itself into an effective regional architecture for peacebuilding. In fact, none of the existing regional organizations in Asia Pacific are adequately equipped to assume substantive responsibility for peacebuilding assistance. Current trends indicate that the need for regional responses will most likely increase, and thus further development of regional responses in the field of peacebuilding assistance is imperative in Asia Pacific.

HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA FOR PEACEBUILDING

In an effort to fill this capacity gap, the government of Japan launched a two-year pilot program for Human Resource Development in Asia for Peacebuilding (HRDAP) in 2007.¹² The HRDAP is an attempt to mainstream peacebuilding into the discourse promoting regional cooperation in Asia Pacific. The pilot phase of the program was completed successfully in March 2009, and it was launched in June 2009 as a full-scale program with a twofold increase in its budget. This official launch demonstrated the commitment of the government of Japan to training civilian experts in the field of peacebuilding. There are three key pillars of the HRDAP activities: (1) six weeks of coursework in Japan; (2) fieldwork in the form of overseas attachments of up to 12 or 24 months; and (3) career development support. The Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) was established to assume overall responsibility for the implementation of the HRDAP, and the UN Volunteers program was asked to play an instrumental role in the overseas attachment and overseas assignment component in which all HPC program associates take part as UN volunteers.

This initiative builds off of a policy speech by then Foreign Minister Taro Aso on August 29, 2006, titled “A School to Build Peace Builders,” in which he emphasized that “peacebuilding is a job that requires a broad range of human resources . . . Everyone can become an instrument in the

building of peace. And that is because . . . peacebuilding is really the act of nation-building.”¹³ He also added, “In order to build and maintain peace, a large number of civilians are also necessary. And it is the civilians that Japan wants to send out in increasing numbers in the future.”¹⁴

The program has produced 30 promising civilian professionals each year—15 from Japan and 15 from other Asian countries, including the 10 ASEAN members, China, India, South Korea, Mongolia, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, and Nepal—for a total of 90 HPC primary course alumni. While the number of HPC alumni is still quite low, the HRDAP has been expanded. As of 2009 the HPC was offering three courses in total: a primary course accommodating 30 program associates (15 Japanese and 15 other Asians); a newly established civilian experts course accommodating 20 senior program associates (10 Japanese and 10 other Asians); and a seminar on basic peacebuilding, another newly established component that was expected to admit 20 to 30 participants.

During the pilot phase, program associates were deployed to overseas field assignments in Asia Pacific and elsewhere in the world. A total of 26 program associates were deployed in Asia Pacific: 3 in Aceh with the International Organization for Migration (IOM); 4 in Cambodia with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS), and the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention; 3 in Sri Lanka with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the IOM; 3 in Nepal with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the UNDP; 8 in Timor-Leste with UNICEF and the UNDP; 2 in Lao PDR with the UNDP and the JMAS; 2 in Thailand with UNESCO; and 1 in Myanmar with the IOM. The others were deployed outside of Asia Pacific, in areas such as Sudan, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, and Kosovo.

Through this program, which was funded by the government of Japan, a Chinese program associate was deployed to Timor-Leste to work as a partnership and resource mobilization officer for the UNDP, together with other program associates from Asia Pacific countries including Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and Japan. This is a small step for peacebuilding in Timor-Leste but one giant leap for regionalism in Asia Pacific. Such modest efforts will surely lay the groundwork for developing regional capacity for peacebuilding in the future. Japan’s HRDAP initiative has the potential to help create and strengthen a platform for advancing functional cooperation if it is closely linked with various related efforts toward regionalism in Asia Pacific. In fact, it can prompt a major breakthrough, leading to possible regional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding. However, the absence

of effective regional frameworks could undermine these efforts toward capacity development for peacebuilding in Asia Pacific. Furthermore, the HRDAP has not been closely coordinated or linked so far with existing initiatives and developments in the region. Nor have other initiatives carried out by the United States, China, or ASEAN countries for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security been in line with existing developments in regionalism in Asia Pacific.

In fact, none of the existing regional frameworks in Asia Pacific that might serve as a platform for human resource development and collective action, such as ASEAN or the ARF, seem to have fully transformed themselves into platforms for advancing functional cooperation among the countries in the region in the area of nontraditional security. As mentioned above, such a development is rare in the field of peacebuilding, and thus further efforts are required to identify potential knots and tie them together in order to create a platform for advancing functional cooperation in peacebuilding assistance.

TRAINING AS A PLATFORM FOR REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

The key terms that can be used to describe recent developments in the field of peacebuilding are “human resource development” and “capacity development for training centers.” In this context, training programs and centers are not simply expected to function literally as providers of human resource development services; rather, their functions are intended to range from serving as confidence-building measures among countries in the region to laying the foundation for a platform for regional cooperation.

The time is now ripe for initiating regional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding in Asia Pacific since, in addition to Japan’s commitment to the HRDAP program, the United States has begun to recognize the significance and utility of developing sufficient regional capacity to address regional problems. For example, the United States has recently reactivated the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI) in Asia Pacific, which was introduced as an outcome of the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps in international peacekeeping operations, but was more active initially in enhancing peacekeeping capacity in Africa. As the GPOI was a product of the G8 Summit, Japan, as a member of the G8, has committed itself to this initiative, and it has assisted financially in developing various peacekeeping training centers in Africa and Asia.

In this context, significant developments in the field of peacekeeping training have already been achieved. As mentioned, capacity development within the AU for regional peacekeeping has been regarded as one of the top priorities of the international community. The UN, the EU, and other donors, including Japan, have been active in supporting AU capacity development, particularly through human resource development. In 2008, the HPC and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force sent instructors to Egypt to the Cairo Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa to assist its training program for African countries. Japan has also deployed a training coordinator, who is an HPC alumnus of the HRDAP program, to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana to organize a series of civilian training courses there, which are funded by the government of Japan.

There are a number of peacekeeping training centers in Asia, as South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal have historically been very active in contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Recently, China also started providing a considerable number of troops and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations. Since the responsibility for the training of these peacekeeping troops and police officers belongs to the contributing countries, each member state conducts training for its troops and police individually in Asia. On the other hand, in Nordic Europe, the countries in the region have agreed on a division of labor, and each country is responsible for providing certain training sets not only for its own nationals but also for the rest of the members in the region.

In Asia, it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of developing a similar regional approach for sharing the burden of training peacekeepers among members of the region. For example, India and Bangladesh could take the lead in training on traditional military tasks in peacekeeping operations, such as truce supervision and military observation, whereas China could expand its capacity to train civilian police (including formed police¹⁵ and riot control units) to accommodate police officers from other countries in the region. Malaysia's peacekeeping training center is well known and has the potential to become a hub for regional peacekeeping training activities for ASEAN countries and beyond.

Both the United States and Japan could assist the capacity development of these existing institutions through the GPOI and push this trend much further. While most of the existing peacekeeping training centers have concentrated on preparing military personnel for conventional peacekeeping tasks so far, the changing nature of peacekeeping operations on the ground

has led them to reconsider their curricula and to include more civilians and more peacebuilding elements in their training.

These issues were discussed in 2007 in Sweden, in 2008 in Nigeria, in 2009 in Australia, and again in November 2009 in Bangladesh at the annual conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), which is an open and voluntary association of institutions dealing with research, education, and training on peacekeeping operations.¹⁶ A civilian functional committee was established within the IAPTC alongside military and police committees, and the Peason Peacekeeping Centre in Canada and the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden have played instrumental roles in addressing the gap in civilian capacity for international peacekeeping. For example, issues related to tracking trainees, addressing planning deficits, and standardizing civilian training have been discussed in past meetings of the civilian functional committee. Although the IAPTC's membership is global, it welcomes the creation of regional subgroups. For example, Latin America and Africa have formed regional groups—the Latin American Association of Training Centres for Peace Operations and the African Peace Support Trainers' Association respectively. The establishment of an equivalent regional grouping has been considered in Asia Pacific.

While regional approaches to peacekeeping have been discussed and concrete actions are beginning to take shape, especially in the field of training, similar initiatives for civilians in peacebuilding have not yet borne fruit, with the sole exception of the HRDAP initiative by the government of Japan. It is true that there are a number of nongovernmental organizations undertaking a wide range of peacebuilding training activities, but these efforts are still at the nascent stage at best in Asia Pacific.¹⁷ But, with the establishment of the HPC, the government of Japan is in a strategic position to assume responsibility for organizing a coordinating body to help regional peacebuilding initiatives by organizing joint training exercises and offering relevant courses. This initiative must be accelerated and coordinated because peacebuilding assistance requires a wide range of civilian inputs in such areas as the rule of law, police reform, legal reform, judicial reform, elections, and refugee assistance, among others. In order to meet the increasing demand on the ground, a large number of civilian experts must be available and ready to be deployed. Nevertheless, countries in the region do not have any regional platform or mechanism that could train, recruit, and deploy civilian experts for peacebuilding in Asia Pacific. (In Europe, for example, the EU can fulfill such functions.)

Therefore, Japan's recent emphasis on pursuing this within the framework of the ARF in partnership with ASEAN is a sound one. This is because Japan has been a leading regional player so far in the field of peacebuilding, and most regional peacebuilding operations—such as state and civil society capacity development—will take place in an ASEAN member state. Indeed, functional regional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding involves “a proactive policy of involvement and assistance to Southeast Asia's weaker nations in order to prevent their internal collapse, [through] direct assistance to firm up electoral processes; an increased commitment to legal and administrative reforms; aid in the development of human capital; or the general strengthening of civil society and the rule of law.”¹⁸ In other words, peacebuilding assistance is regarded as a form of what Surin Pitsuwan, the secretary-general of ASEAN, calls “flexible engagement” or “enhanced interaction” in the context of regionalism.¹⁹

Furthermore, the third ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting, held in Cambodia on June 24–26, 2009, represents one step on the part of the ARF member states toward functional regional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding. In fact, the meeting offered a glimpse of the future direction of and prospects for the ARF serving as a key regionwide platform for developing a regional strategy and policy for peacebuilding assistance. At the meeting, the “Best Practice Reference Paper for Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding”²⁰ was endorsed as an initial living document. The paper highlights the importance of training as a vehicle for developing a platform for regional responses. For example, the document lists as best practices the establishment of “national/regional facilities, including training centers, in order to improve national/regional capacity for peacekeeping/peacebuilding activities” and the conduct of “joint training, exercises, seminars, workshops and research with other countries and relevant civil agencies for regional capacity building and increased interoperability.”²¹ The document also acknowledges that regional efforts, including seminars and expert meetings within the ARF framework, are significant ways of promoting a common understanding of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

THE ARF: A PROMISING REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING?

Against the backdrop of this recent development, this section explores the potential for regional capacity development for peacebuilding within the framework of the ARF. Among the existing regional and subregional

mechanisms, this chapter focuses on an analysis of the ARF as the most promising regional framework for peacebuilding, partly because it is the only regionwide gathering that resembles a security institution in Asia Pacific²² and partly because ASEAN has consistently endorsed the ARF as the main forum for regional security dialogue, with ASEAN as the primary driving force.²³

Before its potential to serve as a regional framework for peacebuilding is considered, the basic characteristics of the ARF should be reviewed. The ARF was originally established to strengthen and enhance political and security cooperation within the region by fostering constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and by promoting confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the region.²⁴ The value of the ARF is its capacity to draw together in one place representatives of most regional states to discuss security issues. It provides one avenue for representatives of regional states to work together on common security concerns peacefully. It also functions to keep people talking routinely and provides a network of linkages that can be used to establish dialogue in a crisis.²⁵

The ARF is guided by the “ASEAN way” of security management. The ASEAN states address security issues and disputes through consultation and dialogue rather than through conventional collective security arrangements and formal mechanisms for settling disputes.²⁶ The ARF is not a dispute-resolution mechanism; rather it was designed to foster political and security cooperation in Asia Pacific to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the region.²⁷ In short, the ARF is aimed at improving the atmospherics of regional relations.

Because of these basic features, some experts are cautious about expecting the ARF to serve as a platform for regional responses. Ellen L. Frost, for example, argues that the ARF is too big and it risks being sidelined.²⁸ Hitoshi Tanaka advocates an “action-oriented regionalism” that goes beyond the existing dialogue-based multilateral institutions and engages states in proactive and cooperative efforts to tackle challenges of common concern. He notes, “While the ARF maintains an important function as a broad security dialogue forum effective for confidence building among its members, very little in the form of concrete cooperative action ever results from its meetings.”²⁹ What the region needs, he argues, is a regionwide security forum with a mandate to take specific and proactive action against such common threats.³⁰

It goes without saying that the region is in need of more action-oriented institutions for the purpose of regional security and beyond. If the region

seeks to address nontraditional security threats collectively, it is vital that a certain level of institutionalization be carried out to facilitate strategic coordination and generate the political support necessary for joint action. Symbolic confidence-building measures, in which the process matters more than the outcome, are inadequate for dealing with the challenges of the 21st century.³¹ Thus, some experts turn to other existing regional mechanisms that are more action oriented than the ARF, such as ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and the East Asia Summit, when looking for substantive, concrete results in the area of regional cooperation.³² For example, Jusuf Wanandi argues that ASEAN+3 should be the main institution for functional cooperation in the region, whereas the ARF can serve as an important vehicle for confidence-building measures and initiatives in the area of nontraditional security.³³

At the same time, however, the ARF has helped institutionalize security dialogue among the region's most significant powers and has succeeded in creating an open and frank forum for discussing regional security issues,³⁴ which could serve as a basis for further development of subregional mechanisms. In fact, the ARF has proven that it can change the parameters of its agenda, and it has exhibited its potential to serve as a forum for the strategic coordination that is needed for collective regional responses or for concerted efforts through global institutions such as the UN. In particular, despite its original constraints, one can point to significant progress in the field of nontraditional responses to security challenges. For example, members have discussed in formal sessions such issues as search-and-rescue at sea, peacekeeping, disaster relief, confidence-building measures, and preventive diplomacy.³⁵

Moreover, as stated above, at the June 2009 ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting, two fundamental issues that are closely related to the nexus between peacebuilding and regionalism—sharing best practices for peacebuilding and networking among peacekeeping training centers in Asia Pacific—were among the topics discussed.³⁶ Within the ARF framework, participants have agreed on the need to improve national and regional capacity for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as the capacity of the UN is already overstretched.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to suggest which regional or subregional framework in Asia Pacific is most appropriate to undertake functional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding. But it can be argued that such a regional or subregional framework will not be effective unless three main regional players—the United States, China, and Japan—are willing to play a pivotal role in shaping the course of future regional responses to nontraditional security challenges.³⁷ In light of their dominant roles, it is

important that these three regional powers reach consensus on common strategic guidelines for regional peacebuilding cooperation before any effective concrete action toward such an end can be envisaged in the region. Successful development of regional peacebuilding capacity will depend upon effective cooperation among these countries, but cooperation runs the risk of being politicized by the power game among them.

It is the ARF that provides a unique forum in which such a broad security dialogue can be conducted among the United States, China, Japan, and the ASEAN members on regional responses in the field of peacebuilding. Hence, the ARF is perhaps the most appropriate venue among the existing regional mechanisms for conducting strategic coordination, especially among the three regional powers. More concrete collective action and coordination might take place in a relevant subregional framework, as Mely Caballero-Anthony suggests: in some areas, subregional responses either by ASEAN or by ASEAN+3 may be more effective because the subregional mechanisms are more institutionalized than the mechanisms set up by larger regionwide groupings such as the ARF.³⁸

FACILITATING REGIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH PEACEBUILDING ASSISTANCE

This chapter has two objectives: One is to examine the role of existing regional frameworks such as the ARF in helping develop responses to regional nontraditional security problems—namely challenges of state failure and peacebuilding—which has been discussed above. The other is to explore the development of regional approaches, which are needed to address not only regionwide problems but also global issues in the field of peacebuilding. At the same time, global peacebuilding assistance can help accelerate such regional cooperation and can be a driving force for regionalism in Asia Pacific, making peacebuilding a concrete avenue for advancing nontraditional security cooperation in Asia Pacific.

Of course, some experts on Asia Pacific affairs and regionalism would argue that it is still premature to envisage collective action in this region for the purpose of addressing the global agenda of state failure and peacebuilding. It is still too early, they would say, to expect any regional organization in Asia Pacific to assume such a global responsibility. Conventional wisdom and the past record of achievements by regional organizations in Asia Pacific would certainly support such an argument, as the discussion on regionalism in Asia Pacific, in contrast to that in Europe, has so far

focused largely on regional responses to regional problems. The rationale for pursuing regionalism has been represented by the slogan “Asian solutions to Asian problems.”

It cannot be denied that a *raison d'être* of regional organizations is to seek regional responses to intraregional concerns and needs. Hence, it is understandable and perhaps legitimate to concentrate on capacity development for regional institutions only to address regional problems in Asia Pacific. Why, then, does the region need to develop mechanisms for regional responses to global issues? Why does peacebuilding in other parts of the world matter to the states and people of Asia Pacific? From the perspective of regionalism, what is the rationale for maintaining global order and stability through nontraditional security cooperation in the field of peacebuilding?

Each member of Asia Pacific may have a different answer to these questions. Developing countries in ASEAN, for example, may claim that they are preoccupied with tackling national and regional problems. Their resources, capacity, and political will are not sufficient to engage in global undertakings such as peacebuilding assistance in Africa, for instance. Some of them may be reluctant to assume greater responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security collectively through regional organizations and may prefer to contribute bilaterally or through the UN. At the same time, however, the region can no longer remain indifferent to recent developments in the practice of maintaining international peace and security through regional organizations.

There is growing recognition that many global nontraditional security threats, such as infectious diseases, piracy, and trafficking, among others, have considerable implications for peace and security in Asia Pacific. In short, peace and prosperity in the region is dependent on the maintenance of a healthy and stable global order. It is in our own interests as a region, therefore, to be involved in the business of global peacebuilding. Moreover, Asia Pacific, which has the largest economy and population in the world, is already an important factor in global international affairs.

Furthermore, current trends indicate that issues on the global agenda—such as peacebuilding—intersect with regional concerns and thus require regional responses in the age of globalization. Regional organizations are increasingly asked to carry out peacekeeping operations in their own regions, and they are sometimes called on to tackle problems that exist outside of their regional boundaries. Together with the UN, the involvement of the EU in the peace process in Guinea-Bissau and that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan are notable examples

of global undertakings by regional organizations. In other words, the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security is expanding in the global context, and it is high time that countries in Asia Pacific come together to make a meaningful contribution to the global agenda of peacebuilding. This is particularly true for the major global powers in the region. The United States, China, and Japan should act together and demonstrate their leadership in the field of peacebuilding so that they can shape the global environment and make it conducive to pursuing regional interests.

It is true that not only are the United States, China, and Japan the dominant regional players in Asia Pacific, but they are indeed key global players and are responsible for addressing global challenges. At the same time, they are also responsible for managing global institutions such as the UN. This poses another set of questions: Why is it not enough for the United States, China, and Japan to strengthen the capacity of the UN to address global problems? Why do they need to invest in the creation of an alternative or supplementary capacity in Asia Pacific to conduct peacebuilding assistance?

In order to answer these inquiries, the shared rationale for tackling issues of global peacebuilding not through the UN but through an anticipated regional channel must be defined. The rationale is that regional capacity development for peacebuilding can offer new opportunities for the region to advance nontraditional security cooperation and to facilitate the participation of China and India—to name but a couple of countries—in our effort toward regional community building. This effort is aimed at mitigating threat perceptions and promoting confidence building and conflict prevention among countries in the region.

When the ARF adopted a statement on the “Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy” in 2001, it was reported that China strongly opposed adding conflict resolution to the agenda, and humanitarian interventions of the sort that NATO carried out in Kosovo were out of the question.³⁹ It is true that China and other nations in ASEAN, such as Myanmar, do not hesitate to reveal their resentment of forceful military interventions and of arguments for the “responsibility to protect” (especially the responsibility to react). But such functions may be irrelevant in the context of Asia Pacific, in which most states maintain a rather conservative attitude toward the coercive use of force in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and where nontraditional security threats preoccupy most of the immediate attention of regional stakeholders. In these nontraditional issues, the object of security is no longer just the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the state,

which we normally assume to be at the core of the discussion, but it can also include the notion of human security or the well-being, dignity, and even survival of human beings as individuals and as members of a society.⁴⁰

In fact, the NATO standard, based on the notion of collective security, is not very relevant in Asia Pacific since full-scale conventional war between states is unlikely.⁴¹ In Asia Pacific, the nature and types of interventions undertaken by regional organizations like ASEAN and the ARF have been remarkably different when compared with regional organizations elsewhere.⁴² In other words, unlike NATO, the anticipated regional peacebuilding platform in Asia Pacific is not expected to provide legitimacy with respect to the use of force in a case in which the UN Security Council is deadlocked; rather it is expected to offer opportunities for the sharing of knowledge and lessons, joint education and training, scenario planning, procedures for command and control, strategic coordination, and consensus building.⁴³

CONCLUSION

In sum, it is argued in this chapter that Asia Pacific should develop its civilian capacity and platform for peacebuilding, in part because such an initiative could reduce the gap that exists in the international community and in part because it could reduce political anxiety among the member states of the region. In an attempt to help fill that gap in the region, Japan has started a series of human resource development initiatives that have the potential to serve as a foundation for the development of such a regional platform for peacebuilding. In fact, soliciting regional cooperation in this regard could be a good way to actually further develop regionalism in Asia Pacific.

This chapter argues that the focus of the initial attempt to further security cooperation in the field of peacebuilding should be on human resource development. Japan's HRDAP program provides a venue for confidence building among and capacity development for members in Asia Pacific. Although at the moment the Japanese initiative is not linked directly with other regional initiatives, it has the potential to serve as a pillar for further development of regional initiatives. Under such circumstances, an attempt by the government of Japan to mainstream the discourse of peacebuilding, human resource development, and capacity development of peacekeeping and peacebuilding training institutions within the discussion of the ARF could be highly effective. While it is true that human resource development

alone is not sufficient to prepare us for collective action on both regional and global crises, it can be a good starting point in that it allows ASEAN, China, and Japan to interact and lay the foundations in the region for joint or collectively coordinated actions.

In fact, exploring regional cooperation in the field of peacebuilding, including collective peacebuilding operations outside the region, can be a good avenue for confidence building and for the nurturing of action-oriented regionalism in Asia Pacific. In particular, sharing training duties among the members of the region is a good avenue for creating and strengthening a platform for security cooperation. In order to coordinate such an initiative among members of the region and to advance regional cooperation in the field of capacity development for peacebuilding, this chapter recommends the establishment of a regional network of training institutions in Asia Pacific. Creating a regional consortium of what might be called “White Beret Academies,” dedicated to training civilian peacebuilding experts in the region, could be one effective means for laying the foundation for a platform for security cooperation. This would include joint training and the sharing of facilities and knowledge and, if possible, joint deployment. Building upon the HRDAP program, Japan could take the lead in framing a regional focus for such initiatives. As Rizal Sukma reminds us, “as ASEAN’s experience has shown, the process is also important, especially for institutions to mature and to induce a level of comfort among the participating states.”⁴⁴

NOTES

1. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* (report of the secretary-general pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the UN Security Council on January 31, 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992), paragraph 21.
2. Donald K. Emmerson, “Introduction: Critical Terms; Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia,” in *Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (Stanford: Shorenstein APARC, 2008), 12.
3. Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Challenging Chance: Nontraditional Security, Democracy, and Regionalism,” in *Hard Choices*, 193 and 204.
4. Tadashi Yamamoto and James Gannon, “East Asia at a Crossroads,” in *East Asia at a Crossroads*, ed. Jusuf Wanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2008), 11; and Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture,” in *Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition and the Search for Community*, ed. Bates Gill and Michael Green (New York: Columbia University, 2008), 306.
5. Emmerson, “Introduction,” 5.

6. Jörn Dosch, "Managing Security in ASEAN-China Relations: Liberal Peace of Hegemonic Stability," *Asian Perspective* 31, no. 1 (2007): 214.
7. *Ibid.*, 216.
8. Jusuf Wanandi, "East Asian Regionalism and Global Governance," in *East Asia at a Crossroads*, 36.
9. Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regionalization of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership*, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (Singapore) Working Paper no. 42 (January 2003), 1.
10. S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," *Security Studies* no. 2 (Autumn 1992): 11, as quoted in Caballero-Anthony, *Regionalization of Peace in Asia*, 4.
11. Neither Indonesia's proposal to create an ASEAN peacekeeping force nor the Philippines' attempt to revitalize a so-called "White Helmet Initiative" in the region has materialized.
12. See the website of the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, www.peacebuilderscenter.jp/eng/index_e.html.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), "A School to Build Peace Builders—Keynote Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs," August 29, 2006, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/seminaro608-s.html.
14. *Ibid.*
15. In order to increase the effectiveness of civilian police units in UN peacekeeping operations, formed police units were created. Unlike civilian police units in which each police officer is recruited individually for a mission, formed police units are recruited as an organic group from a contributing state. The expectation is that such units can respond more effectively and in a timelier manner when there are outbreaks of serious violence during peacekeeping operations.
16. The IAPTC promotes better understanding of peacekeeping, its goals and objectives, and the methods used in training for peace operations of all types. It also offers peacekeeping training center personnel a forum for discussions related to training without their having to deal with national interests (and sometimes restrictions). Each year there is an annual conference, and the host country or organization is responsible for preparing the event and developing the theme and agenda. For more information, see www.iaptc.org/about.html.
17. For instance, the Peace and Development Institute in Sri Lanka (www.pdisl.org/home) conducts a number of professional training programs. The International Alert (www.international-alert.org/), a UK-based peacebuilding NGO, offers a variety of peacebuilding training programs in various parts of the world.
18. Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Southeast Asia's Points of Convergence on International Intervention," in *Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative Action*, ed. Sorpong Peou (London: Routledge, 2008), 70.
19. Caballero-Anthony, "Challenging Chance," 203.
20. MOFA, "Best Practices Reference Paper for Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding (revised as of June 26, 2009)," www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/arf/summary0906-a.pdf.
21. *Ibid.*
22. The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua

- New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Vietnam.
23. Ellen L. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 137.
 24. Caballero-Anthony, *Regionalization of Peace in Asia*, 10.
 25. David Dickens, "Lessening the Desire for War: The ASEAN Regional Forum and Making of Asia Pacific Security," Center for Strategic Studies (University of Wellington) Working Paper no. 11 (1998).
 26. Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," Adelphi Paper 302 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1996), 14 and 25, as quoted in Dickens, "Lessening the Desire for War."
 27. "Joint Communiqué of the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting" (Bangkok, July 22–23, 1994), as quoted in Dickens, "Lessening the Desire for War."
 28. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, 137.
 29. Hitoshi Tanaka with Adam P. Liff, "The Strategic Rationale for East Asia Community Building," in *East Asia at a Crossroads*, 101–102.
 30. Ibid.
 31. Caballero-Anthony, "Challenging Chance," 206.
 32. Wanandi, "East Asian Regionalism," 36.
 33. Ibid., 32
 34. Dickens, "Lessening the Desire for War."
 35. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, 137.
 36. MOFA, "Co-chair's Summary Report of the 3rd ARF Peacekeeping Experts' Meeting," www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/arf/summary0906.html.
 37. Erik Beukel argues that the establishment of a multilateral institution to supplement the existing web of security institutions is dependent on the participation of the three main regional players: the United States, China, and Japan. See Beukel, *ASEAN and ARF in East Asia's Security Architecture: The Role of Norms and Powers*, DIIS Report no. 4 (2008): 28.
 38. Caballero-Anthony, "Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism," 320. Jusuf Wanandi suggests otherwise, arguing that the East Asia Summit should be converted into a forum for discussing strategic issues, while ASEAN+3 should be the main institution for functional cooperation in the region, and the ARF should serve as an important vehicle for confidence-building measures and initiatives in the area of nontraditional security. See Wanandi, "East Asian Regionalism," 32.
 39. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, 137.
 40. Caballero-Anthony, "Challenging Chance," 194.
 41. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, 197.
 42. Caballero-Anthony, *Regionalization of Peace in Asia*, ii.
 43. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, 137.
 44. Rizal Sukma, "Human Security Cooperation as a Building Block for East Asia Community," in *East Asia at a Crossroads*, 115.